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Grid infrastructures require a high degree of fault tolerance and reliability. This can only be 
achieved by careful planning and detailed implementation. We describe on-going work within 
the WLCG project to build and run highly reliable services. Following the "a priori" analysis 
based on the services and service levels listed in the Memorandum of Understanding that sites 
participating in WLCG have signed[1], this paper provides an "a posteriori" analysis 
following over 2 years of production service. This work covers not only the services deployed 
at the Tier0 centre at CERN - which has the most stringent service requirements related to the 
acquisition of the raw data, the initial processing phase and the distribution of raw and 
processed data to Tier1 sites, but also a similar analysis for Tier1 and major Tier2 sites. The 
latter will be covered at a workshop that will take place shortly before the EELA conference 




The target service levels that must be reached by sites that are members of the Worldwide 
LHC Computing Grid (WLCG) [2] – and hence signatories of the WLCG Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) [3] – range from 99% for key Tier0 services to 95% for some services 
at Tier2s. However, these targets are not for individual services, but for higher level 
functionality, such as “acceptance of raw data from the Tier0 centre during accelerator 
operation”. Furthermore, the experiments – in particular CMS – have established lists of so-
called “critical services”, the consequences to the experiment in case of downtime or service 
degradation, and the maximum acceptable delay for problem resolution. Based on these 
requirements, as well as several years‟ experience of running production Grid services, a 
simple “tool-kit” for deploying highly available services has been established. This is coupled 
to a “checklist” for new services, as well as recommendations for middleware and database 
developers, together with operational techniques and procedures.  All of these issues will be 
discussed during a WLCG Service Reliability workshop (to be) held at CERN during the 
week of November 26 – 30 2007. Whilst up-to-date information will be presented during the 
EELA 3 conference, the deadlines for paper submission are such that the information given 
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below is based on the preparatory work for the workshop and not the final outcome. However, 
no significant changes in terms of the basic recommendations are expected – the main 
deliverable is to develop a concrete timeline for deploying these techniques across the key 
sites (as dictated by the experiments‟ requirements) and to understand how the delivered 
service level can be effectively monitored. 
 
2. Service Intervention Analysis 
 
An analysis of the service interventions that have occurred over the last two years indicates 
that the dominant interventions are still unscheduled. In particular, a significant number of 
service interruptions are due to power and cooling problems and network interruptions. These 
give a “background” against which other types of interruption or degradation need to be 
measured – there is no point in investing heavily to protect against rare cases when a major 
cause of downtime remains unresolved. Examples of service problems and the frequency that 
may be expected are given below: 
 
• Network cut between pit & B513: based on experience, ~1 per decade, fixed in ~4 hours 
(the network cable is largely redundant) 
• Oracle cluster-ware “crash”: ~1 per year (per RAC?) – recovery in < 1 hour 
• Logical data corruption – database level: ~1 per decade, painful recovery (consistency 
checks can help here, but scripts run directly against the DB have been shown to cause 
much higher levels of corruption 
• Data corruption – file level: being addressed – otherwise a certainty! 
• Power & cooling: will we get to (<) ~1 per site per year? Soon? 
• Critical service interruption: 1 per year per VO? Most likely higher in 2008 
 
3. The whole is greater than the sum of the parts 
 
The (W)LCG Technical Design Report (TDR) [4] lists two motivations for adopting a Grid 
solution. These are as follows: 
1. Significant costs of [ providing ] maintaining and upgrading the necessary resources … 
more easily handled in a distributed environment, where individual institutes and … 
organisations can fund local resources … whilst contributing to the global goal 
2. … no single points of failure. Multiple copies of the data, automatic reassigning of tasks 
to resources… facilitates access to data for all scientists independent of location. … 
round the clock monitoring and support. 
For funding reasons, the first argument is clearly extremely important – for the reason stated 
in addition to the fact that many of the institutes involved are multi-disciplinary. Thus, not 
only for resource sharing within a site but also to bolster the scientific and intellectual 
environment in the collaborating countries, such a scenario is much healthier than one where 
all resources are concentrated at the host laboratory (and acquired locally). 
The second argument needs further analysis and is indeed similar to the 3
rd
 criterion in Ian 
Foster‟s Grid computing checklist [5]: 
 
“… to deliver nontrivial qualities of service. (A Grid allows its constituent resources to be 
used in a coordinated fashion to deliver various qualities of service, relating for example to 
response time, throughput, availability, and security, and/or co-allocation of multiple resource 
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types to meet complex user demands, so that the utility of the combined system is 
significantly greater than that of the sum of its parts.)” 
 
With the exception of services and processing that is performed at the Tier0 site, the fact that 
much of the data is replicated at several or many sites, the partial or even total failure of a site 
should not stop the associated production or analysis. Similarly, some of the services – such 
as the reliable File Transfer Service (FTS) – are already designed to cater for service 
interruptions at source and/or sink site: if the storage element (SE) at a given site is about to 
enter scheduled maintenance, the corresponding FTS channels that source or sink data in that 
SE can be paused. This still allows new transfer requests to be queued, but they will not be 
attempted until the channel is re-opened, avoiding wasting bandwidth on transfers that are 
bound to fail and potentially reducing the background load on support staff (analysing “fake” 
failures.) 
 
4. Building Robust Services 
 
Robust services can only be delivered through careful planning complemented by a 
combination of techniques, including the appropriate steps at application design and 
implementation level, as well as at the deployment and operational stage. We describe below 
very simple techniques that have proven extremely effective and widely applicable in 
designing and delivering reliable services with a reasonable level of effort and – importantly – 
largely avoiding fire-fighting and panic. 
 
Two mindsets that are particularly important in this respect are: 
 Think service – a service is far more than a middleware release in a „production‟ 
repository; 
 Think Grid – a Grid is the ultimate distributed computing system (so far). A change to a 
service deployed at a given site or site(s) may well have an impact far wider than the 
local community and must be planned and announced accordingly. 
Before we list the techniques that are in daily use for deploying and operating the WLCG 
service, we consider some of the issues related to failures and support calls, together with 
their associated costs. 
 
Consider, for example, the reliable file transfer service. Given the expected data volumes and 
rates, a typical LHC experiment will transfer globally of the order of 10
5
 1GB files per day – 
many more if analysis data and calibration datasets are also included. The percentage of such 
transfers that fail in such a way that human intervention is required must be extremely low, 
particularly as the problems seen after automatic retries are often complex and time 
consuming to resolve. Other examples come from user support costs. A ticket that a ticket 
processing manager spends 1 hour on (and may take much more to solve) has a real and non-
negligible cost associated with it. Not all such problems can be avoided purely through good 
documentation and robust services, but there is clearly very strong motivation to do so. 
Finally, any operational issues that require human follow up must be reduced to the absolute 
minimum – anything that can be documented in English (or indeed any other language) can 
also be programmed as a script or in a higher level language – computers are simply much 
better and cheaper at doing repetitive tasks rapidly than humans, whose particular analytical 
skills are best used elsewhere. 
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5. Check-list for New Services 
 
Before a new service is deployed – be it in a Grid or non-Grid environment – a 
straightforward checklist has been established that has proven invaluable in ensuring that the 
resultant services are of the required quality. Ideally, this work starts well prior to deployment 
– the middleware must be designed and written with reliability in mind. This includes details 
such as error messages and logging – this must be consistent and in an agreed place to which 
the necessary support teams have access if required (the latter is non-trivial in the case of 
cross-site services). The application must be designed to cope with “glitches” – e.g. short-
lived problems with services on which they depend and which are simply unavoidable in a 
distributed environment. Where possible, the ability to share the load across multiple load 
balanced servers offers numerous advantages, including transparency to many common 
service interventions and even middleware upgrades. In the case of a database backend, the 
ability to re-establish a connection and – assuming a database cluster – failover transparently 
from one node to another are mandatory features. The appropriate hardware must obviously 
be allocated – avoiding (except in cases such as batch worker nodes) single points of failure 
through power supplies or feeds, network connections and so forth. Finally, a minimum set of 
operational procedures – including contact names and addresses – together with a basic set of 
tests (no contact, high load etc.) is needed. The necessary workflows also needed to be 
established in the support lines, together with diagnostic tests and procedures for the various 
levels of support / operations teams. Starting with these essentials, the service manager can 
readily add more tests and procedures as experience shows are required. 
 
6. Daily and Weekly Operations Meetings 
 
One of the key secrets to running smooth services is a regular operations meeting. This has 
been in place at CERN since decades before the Grid and used to be performed by vendors 
(CERN having a number of large mainframes / clusters at that time). In recent years, these 
meetings have been extended to cover the Grid world, with a clear impact on the state of the 
Grid services. On occasion, people have expressed „disappointment‟ that there is not an 
atmosphere of mad panic / firefighting at these meetings – but this is precisely the point – 
these meetings are to ensure a smooth service, exactly the opposite of firefighting. Instead of 
being an overhead, these meetings act as an excellent point of information exchange, and in 
fact significantly reduce the amount of time spent on identifying and debugging problems. 
The meetings typically take around 10 minutes – slightly longer on Mondays – and quickly 
run through alarms and problems seen since the last meeting. If not immediately solved, the 
problems are assigned to a system administrator or technical expert as appropriate. More 
importantly, they allow weaknesses in the services – such as lack of adequate monitoring or 
alarms – to be exposed and peer pressure proves a very effective mechanism for ensuring that 
these holes are rapidly plugged. Once a week, any outstanding tickets against the CERN 
Regional Operations Centre are reviewed, again ensuring that problems are not left 
unaddressed for prolonged periods. Another important topic that is reviewed daily is any 
interventions scheduled for that day, or any foreseen in the coming days. It cannot be stressed 
too highly how important adequate preparation for interventions has repeatedly been proved 
to be – it is not just a question of informing fellow service providers and users, but also 
ensuring that the intervention proceeds smoothly. All too often, a well debugged procedure 
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runs into problems (often because it is not strictly followed, or as the availability of needed 
colleagues for a given step has not been checked), turning a smooth or even “transparent” 
intervention into a prolonged downtime that may even need a further intervention to 
adequately complete. In the worst cases, unannounced “transparent” interventions have 
resulted in severe service degradation that have led to extreme user dissatisfaction and have 
been extremely costly in terms of manpower to resolve. We have therefore agreed simple 
procedures for announcing scheduled interventions of various lengths, as well as unscheduled 
interventions. Equally importantly, an announcement through the agreed channels is required 
when the service is fully restored (or periodic announcements in case of prolonged problems), 
as well as an open post-mortem, recording any unforeseen problems, their resolutions and 
lessons for the future. These daily – primarily site-oriented (see caveat above) meetings are 
complemented by weekly joint operations meetings with all the main sites that have a similar 
agenda but also include VO-specific issues. Finally, less frequent meetings are held to ensure 
that the operations tools adequately address the needs of the community. These meetings are 
typically held bi-annually. 
 
7. Key Techniques 
 
The main techniques that are used in conjunction with the standard operations procedures are 
both simple and well-understood: 
 Understanding the impact of downtime or degradation to service. In some cases, it may 
even be acceptable for a problem only to be resolved the next working day whereas in 
others this would clearly be unacceptable: resources being limited, the effort (and 
money) needs to be focused in the right places; 
 The use of database clusters for middleware components that have persistent state 
(together with the appropriate deployment and application development strategies); 
 Load-balanced servers for the middle tier. 
These techniques not only allow services to be resilient to single (or even multiple) 
component failure, but permit many of the common interventions to be performed with zero 
user-visible downtime. These include operating system, database or middleware upgrade or 
security patches as well as the addition of new hardware / replacement of old or failure nodes. 
In the case of the best behaving applications, these techniques have been fully supported for a 
number of years. Further work is required to make all of the main WLCG services sufficiently 
resilient – this is currently underway, being driven by the priorities of the experiments. 
 
8. Middleware and Database Development Techniques 
 
CVS: „ça va saigner‟ 
Subversion: Destroying someone's (or some group's) honesty or loyalty; undermining moral 
integrity 
 
The key point about designing middleware for robustness and resilience is to incorporate 
these aspects into the initial design. This is because many of the deployment and operational 
features already discussed have an impact on the basic architecture and design of the 
software; it is typically much more expensive to retrofit high-availability features onto a 
software product after the design and implementation (although it is possible). In general, the 
service scaling and high-availability needs typically mandate a more decoupled architecture. 
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Decoupling the different sub-components of a single service from each other is extremely 
desirable – quite apart from the long-term maintainability of the code, debugging the running 
service in production is much easier if the architecture is cleanly defined and the 
responsibilities of the components are clear. It is also advantageous from the point of view of 
basic operations of the service. For example, the FTS allows the agent daemons (that actually 
do the real work of processing the file transfers) to be taken down for intervention, moved or 
redistributed while maintaining the front-end of the service up and running, so that the users 
can continue to interact with the system. The individual channels in the service may be taken 
down separately for intervention without affecting the other channels in the service. 
 
The internal architecture and design of a service must assume that some sub-components of 
the service will be unavailable at some times (either due to scheduled maintenance or 
unscheduled problems) – individual components should be resilient to failures of the other 
components, or at least the failures modes should be understood and documented, together 
with the impact on the overall service. Experience has shown time and again that this is the 
major cause for „mysterious‟ service failures and lock-ups - and these sorts of problems can 
absorb considerable debugging effort. What happens to a service component, for example, 
when the central logging server all the components rely on goes down? Does it stop? Is it 
acceptable (from an audit point of view) for the service to continue without the central logger? 
Another example of over-coupled architectures is the often excessive use of remote procedure 
call between sub-components. Sometimes the use of RPC desirable, but generally, passing 
critical information in this way should be avoided – favouring instead the use of a 
transactional system such as a database. 
 
Limiting the state maintained in the middle-tier of a service is also important – for example, 
the LFC and FTS services commit frequently to the database and the user operations on the 
service are designed to be transactional, such that even in the case of immediate power loss, 
they will come back up without any loss of data that the user has committed into the service 
(or any corrupted state). Sessions, if required, should be migratable, or at least, individual 
instances of the load-balanced service should be „drainable‟. The use of industry-standard 
components (e.g. Apache) to build up a service helps with this since many of these service-
oriented features come „for free‟. 
 
The basic rule of „Think Service‟ should be applied to the middleware design – this is often 
overlooked in the rush to get user-facing features „out of the door‟. Can a service be cleanly 
paused without affecting the user‟s ability to interact with it? Can a node / channel / part of 
the service be cleanly „drained‟ such that its removal does not affect the running service? The 
robustness and resilience of the overall service are critically dependent on providing to the 
service manager facilities to allow common scheduled interventions (e.g. node replacement, 
kernel upgrade) to take place with minimum impact to the service; these facilities can also 
help ameliorate the impact of unscheduled interventions. 
 
For a distributed Grid where the often the overall service that the user „cares about‟ depends 
on multiple services, potentially in multiple administrative domains (e.g. file transfer) the 
same rule applies – services should be designed assuming that there will be occasional 
outages of their dependent services, outages of the wide-area network and other such glitches 
[Rules of Distributed Computing]. Ideally, the middleware should seek to „add value‟ in this 
regard making the overall service more resilient to these glitches (“The whole is greater than 
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the sum of its parts”). These features should then be fed back into the grid operational 
procedures (or automated systems) to make sure that they are used where appropriate. The 
other point is to think how the overall service will be debugged - which leads to requirements 
such as the adoption of a reasonably uniform logging format (e.g. use UTC in log timestamps, 
or at worst standard TZ-stamped formats) 
 
Often the most critical part of grid services is the database. Apart from the HA deployment of 
the database itself, there are a number of simple techniques to improve the reliability of 
middleware with regard to its interaction with the database: 
 Connection retries. The middleware should retry to connect if a database connection 
becomes unusable. There are a variety of standard connection-pooling 
implementations available that do this, many coming for „free‟ if you build the 
application using an industry-standard tool such as Apache or J2EE containers. For 
multi-threaded applications, connection pooling is also critical for performance since 
databases suffer rather badly under constant connection/reconnection loads. Making 
sure the application and its deployment scripts are written to make use of the DB‟s 
High Availability features also help considerably (e.g. Oracle‟s Transparent 
Application Failover); 
 Using the database to enforce all known integrity constraints is good design and helps 
considerably for the robustness of a service. It helps catch application logic errors 
which can otherwise be very hard to debug. In an environment (such as HEP) where 
the application requirements are evolving, ad-hoc „scripts‟ tend to appear, either bug 
workarounds or one-off tools providing functionality not in the software (for example, 
“please add this extra ACL to all 30 million files in this file catalog with no online 
performance impact”). Having the database enforce constraints is advisable since not 
all of these „scripts‟ are of production quality and experience has shown that the cost 
of logical schema corruption on a production system is extremely high; 
 Testing of the application with new versions of the (database) software prior to its 
deployment is also critical to smooth service operations – it is not unknown for high 
performance grid applications to expose bugs and glitches in new versions of the 
database software; 
 Testing the application at an appropriate scale on a reasonably sized validation cluster is 
also important, since many issues only appear at close to production scale; 
 Maintain a good relationship with your database administrator (DBA), and don‟t treat 
the database as a „black box‟. There are a number of simple techniques your DBA can 
advise you on – the use of bind variables (your DBA can show you where you forgot 
to use them), appropriate schema design, appropriate use of indices (your DBA can 
show you where you need to define a new one) and appropriate use of more advanced 
DB-specific features such as table partitioning. These features become more and more 
important as the amount of data stored by your service grows (and, if neglected, will 
typically begin to bite just as your main production phase begins, when you have the 
least time to deal with it). 
 
Many more suggestions for good database / software interactions (focussed on Oracle) can be 
found in [6]. 
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9. Critical services 
 
The services that an LHC experiment relies on to run its production include a number of 
important VO-specific components over and above the standard Grid middleware-based ones. 
If one of these services is down or impaired, the experiment is impacted at least as severely as 
if one of the key Grid services was down. It is therefore essential to address the reliability of 
these components. A proposal that has yet to be put in place is to treat these services in the 
same manner as the standard Grid services, including techniques for writing robust services as 
well as their deployment and operation. Particularly in the early months and years of data 
taking, it is likely that there will still be some residual instability in some of these services and 
it is proposed that in the key areas of storage, Grid data management and databases for 
physics that an on-call service is established. This would allow technical specialists to be 
contacted 24x7 in case of problems that cannot be resolved using the standard documented 
procedures. It will clearly provide significant motivation to further improve the robustness of 
the services and it is foreseen that the need for such on-call be reviewed annually. For other 
important services, for which a permanent on-call rota is not justified, named contacts within 
each of the experiments will be able to call out an expert by passing through the console 
operators. Such interventions need to be relatively rare and will also be regularly monitored to 
understand both the need and sustainability of the system. 
 
10. Monitoring, Logging and Reporting 
 
These related but distinct aspects of running a service are often confused. Furthermore, the 
specific information that should be presented depends very much on the target audience. A 
common trap is to try and build everything into a single tool, which continues to grow until it 
is un-maintainable and even unusable. For example, a funding agency may be concerned with 
how well the resources provided being used. A VO manager may wish to see how well their 
production is proceeding. A site administrator on the other hand may simply want to see if his 
or her services up and running and meeting the agreed MoU targets. The on-duty operations 
team will typically want to know if there any outstanding alarms. Finally, an LHCC referee 
may want to see how the overall preparation progressing with any areas of concern 
highlighted. Nevertheless, much of the information that would need to be collected is 
common and so it is important to separate the collection from presentation (views…), as well 
as the discussion on metrics. It is precisely this approach that is being adopted – with some 
success – by the LCG monitoring working groups that were created one year ago. In addition, 
the issue of improved and consistent logging is being actively pursued by the middleware 
developers – the status of both of these issues being presented at the EGEE‟07 conference in 
Budapest. 
 
11. Mind The Gap 
 
During the above conference, a number of service problems came up that highlighted the need 
for well documented – and followed – procedures, as well as excellent communication. To be 
explicit, three significant service problems came up in a single week – all of which were 
easily avoidable. These were as follows: 
 A bug in Oracle client libraries – both documented and already fixed in production 
releases – caused a number of daemons to go into an infinite loop (after 248 days of 
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uptime – the maximum number of clock-ticks (1/10s) that can be represented in a 32bit 
integer). An analysis of the problem revealed that not only are there numerous methods 
for deploying Oracle client releases but also there was no consistent agreement for 
which of these to use, nor for moving to new versions; 
 A change to the service availability algorithm – improved in principle at the various 
management boards – was released in production without being scheduled or even 
announced via the regular operations meetings. This caused significant knock-on effects 
in other service monitoring tools; 
 A database house-keeping exercise resulted in an index being de-selected, with 
following service overload and meltdown. 
Whilst it is unlikely that all such problems can be avoided in the future, we cannot afford to 
tolerate such a high rate of completely avoidable issues. Hopefully, the experience from these 
events will reinforce the widespread adoption of the simple and lightweight procedures that 
have been shown to work in exactly these situations. 
 
12. Caveat Emptor 
 
A final piece of cautionary advice concerns coupling between services and the sometimes 
unexpected consequences. Two concrete examples in this area relate to the choice of database 
synchronization technology that we have deployed. This is used for the file catalog 
middleware component and for detector and calibration alignment information – in both cases 
the corresponding information is kept in sync between the main sites with minimal delays. 
However, this has meant on one occasion that a key database feature had to be disabled – with 
significant consequences on the ability to recover the service in case of accidental loss of data 
– and on another led to silent data corruption. On balance, the benefits certainly outweigh the 
drawbacks, but underline the need for openness and transparency – the reasons for choosing a 
specific release and the consequences must be clear to all, particularly in the case of complex, 
layered services. 
 
13. Conclusions on Robust Services 
 
Taken together, these techniques and procedures have been demonstrated to be sufficient to 
offer robust and resilient services, but are unfortunately often overlooked. We know how to 
run reliable services – this is not to say that no user support issues remain! The issue of 
support for large and diverse user communities of a system with the complexity of the Grid is 
certainly one of the challenges that will need to be addressed by future e-infrastructures. In 
particular, it is essential that we neither design nor use Grids in such a way that the 
unavailability of a single service renders a site – or worse the entire Grid – down. Such 
problems should, in the worst case, result in a small inefficiency of the overall Grid resources, 
rather than a downtime. 
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14. Summary and conclusions 
 
We have described a set of basic techniques for the design, implementation, deployment and 
operation of robust and resilient Grid services. These techniques are now being extended 
beyond the basic set of WLCG services to cover also experiment-specific services that are 
critical to their production activities. These techniques are sufficiently general as to be 
applicable to many other application domains and indeed other Grid projects. May the force 
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